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Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi speaks to the media at Mandali border crossing
between Iraq and Iran, in Mandali, Iraq July 11, 2020. REUTERS/Thaier al-Sudani/Pool –
RC22RH9YS9RG.
 
Protests last year decried corruption as the main source of the Iraq’s struggles in the post-
2003 area. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi came to o ce in the wake of the protests, and
soon began a campaign to address the problem at one of the sites most notorious for
corruption: the country’s border crossings. Beginning in July 2020, two months after he
assumed o ce, Kadhimi travelled to a border crossing on the Iraq-Iran border located in
Diyala province. With security o cials standing to his left and right, he proclaimed a “new era”
in  ghting corruption, and that border guards now had the authorisation to “shoot” at those
who violate the rules of the customs zone. Kadhimi then turned to the head of Iraq’s border
authority and instructed him to “search for ghosts”, referring to an unnamed network of
actors involved in pro ting off illicit cross-border trade.
Kadhimi’s usage of vague language points to the delicate nature of the border issue. A
number of local observers have documented how the political parties and their corresponding
armed branches rely on the border crossings as crucial sources of revenue. Thus, in theory,
tackling corruption at the border would mean attacking the heart of Iraq’s political and
security establishment. Would Kadhimi – a Prime Minister that most analysts have described
as weak due to a lack of parliamentary support – be able to pull off such a feat?
The Prime Minister’s O ce staked a signi cant amount of political capital in the border
campaign, and quickly declared a swift and resounding victory. Just  ve months later, the
border authority under the Prime Minister’s O ce released customs and tariffs revenue data
indicating Kadhimi’s measures had been remarkably successful. A supposed
168,567,919.050 billion IQD (115,513,530.40 USD) of revenues had been recovered over the
period that followed Kadhimi’s measures.
A closer look at the data, however, reveals that it entirely omits revenue numbers from the
very border crossings where Kadhimi publicly launched his campaign amidst great fanfare –
those in Diyala province. This omission leaves a gaping hole in the government’s success
story. One possible explanation for the lack of Diyala data is that Kadhimi and his advisors are
contending with the realities of Iraq’s fragmented political terrain, one in which entire
provinces – and their corresponding strategic assets such as border crossings – come under
the effective control of speci c political parties and armed groups.
Badr at the Border
The Badr Organization – which has 17 seats in the national parliament as well as numerous
PMF brigades under its control – is among Iraq’s most powerful majority-Shia political
parties. In the wake of the anti-ISIS campaign, Badr has leveraged its signi cant military role
in the liberation effort to solidify control over speci c territories, particularly Diyala province.
Badr holds all the key government positions in the province. Badr likewise dominates Diyala’s
security sector through various aligned PMF brigades, Iraqi Security Forces, and police. This
near totalising capture of the state in Diyala has granted Badr effective control over two major
border crossings – the Munthiriya crossing to the north of the province and Mandali to the
south. Customs o cials carry out their duties with the understanding that they have to
collaborate with the Badr-controlled political and security apparatus in the province.
As a matter of strategic interest, Badr relies on its two Diyala border crossings for revenues –
which are particularly important given the global reduction of oil prices — and military support
from its key ally Iran. Symbolically, both Badr and Iran project themselves as the protectors of
Shia pilgrims using these two crossings en route to shrines in Samarra, Baghdad, Najaf, and
other sites in the south.
As Kadhimi embarked on his border campaign, he knew that these interests and power
structures on the ground would not change, and the best he could do was negotiate a
symbolic reassertion of state authority over the border. When the Prime Minister came to
Diyala and declared that the Army’s Rapid Response Forces (RRF) as well as the PMF would
now oversee border crossing in the area, the move immediately came under scrutiny of local
observers . One local commentator called it a “a show for the media”. Indeed, the close ties
between these two particular forces and the Badr Organization would suggest that the move
was cosmetic at best. The commandership and rank-and- le of both the RRF and the PMF are
directly linked into Badr leadership. The  ows of cash into party coffers would not change in
any major way.
The Kurdish Crossings
The Diyala border crossings were not alone in receiving visits from the Prime Minister. This
was a nationwide-wide campaign with a number of prominent public appearances. Following
appearances at the borders in Diyala and then subsequently Basra, Kadhimi then set his
sights on Iraqi Kurdistan and visited both the Bashmakh crossing in Sulaymaniyah and the
Ibrahim Khalil crossing in Dohuk.
The Kurdish visits were delicately choreographed and struck a more reserved tone. Instead of
making public statements declaring a change in policy, the Prime Minister limited himself to a
series of staged inspections and private meetings. Kurdish o cials greeted the Prime
Minister and displayed the border’s facilities,  nancial controls, and even their COVID-19
protocols. A Kurdish MP noted that Kadhimi reportedly thanked the Kurdish o cials for their
work and professionalism. Though Kadhimi made general allusions to the need for greater
cooperation between Erbil and Baghdad, there was no concrete suggestion that the federal
government would impose measures to combat corruption or ensure that the 50/50 split of
revenue between the KRG and the GoI was indeed being enforced.
Kadhimi’s reserved message at the Kurdish crossings re ects a long-standing reality: since
1991, Kurdish peshmerga have effectively controlled the borders without any presence of the
Iraqi security forces. Though many political factions in Baghdad decry the lack of federal
oversight, the fact remains that both the Iraqi government and international partners have
long treated the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as the legitimate authority over border
management.
No amount of pressure from Kadhimi or the Baghdad-based political parties will
fundamentally alter the KRG’s hold over its borders. Both of the region’s dominant political
parties look to the borders as an existential issue. The region’s crossings with Turkey and Iran
are controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), respectively. Border guards and customs o cials are appointed by the KRG but take
orders from the two parties.
As discussed in prior research on Kurdistan’s patronage system, the dominant Kurdish parties
have relied heavily upon the two crossings for revenues since 1991. Today, even despite the
region’s generation of oil revenues, the crossings remain at the heart of the parties’  nancial
capacity in addition to maintaining the symbolism of the region as a semi-independent entity
with bilateral relations of its own. Turkey and Iran, for their part, have little interest in seeing a
change to the status quo as both Ankara and Tehran have long-standing political and
economic relationships with the KDP and PUK. Any substantive reassertion of federal
authority at the borders would destabilise these relationships.
Careful Messaging
The message of the border visits was unmistakable. Kadhimi — who himself is known for his
careful attention to his image in the media — understood that the country’s far ung border
crossings have long been known for being domains outside of state control. He also
understood that Western partners would look favorably upon any effort to diminish the
 nancial basis of the PMF. Following the visits, one Washington-based security analyst stated
that the measures taken by the Iraqi Prime Minister at the border crossings aimed at
“securing funds for the cash-strapped government while denying them to militias.”
These expressions of optimism over the potential for the diminishment of militia  nances did
not adequately take into account the relationship between the PMF-aligned parties and the
state. In Diyala, the Badr Organisation and its PMF a liates enjoy de facto sovereignty and
not the government. Iraqi authorities in the province – including those who oversee border
revenues – are themselves aligned with Badr, and there is little if any prospect of
disentangling the two. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish parties’ control over the border is both a
re ection of their interests and a product of the post-2003 constitution, which granted the
KRG authority over its territories. In both the case of Diyala and Iraqi Kurdistan, Kadhimi’s
border campaign realised its limits in the face of Iraq’s party-controlled political structure.
Conclusions: Challenges in Fighting Corruption
Corruption at border crossings is not speci c to Iraq. But the existing literature locates the
problem in the poor infrastructure at the peripheries, lack of automated systems, and the
networks of collusion between border communities, traders, and customs o cials. The
assertion of state control in these contexts is thus a matter of technical governance and
security improvements. This presumes the existence of a relatively coherent state authority
with su cient capacity to shape power dynamics on the ground. The post-2003 political
order in Iraq has witnessed the rise of political parties and their armed a liates as state-like
entities with control over speci c territorial domains and cross-border corridors. As the
parties are stronger than the state, the best the Prime Minister can hope for is maintaining a
degree of symbolic authority in areas under party control. In this regard, Kadhimi’s focus on
developing sophisticated media messaging — with highly publicised appearances at Iraq’s
borders — is perhaps good short-term politics. In the long-term, any substantive effort at
tackling corruption will require meaningful constraints on the power of the parties.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of the Con ict Research
Programme, the London School of Economics and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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